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Abstract
Prediction markets provide an efficient means
to assess uncertain quantities from forecast-
ers. Traditional and competitive strictly
proper scoring rules have been shown to in-
centivize players to provide truthful proba-
bilistic forecasts. However, we show that
when those players can cooperate, these
mechanisms can instead discourage them
from reporting what they really believe.
When players with different beliefs are able to
cooperate and form a coalition, these mech-
anisms admit arbitrage and there is a report
that will always pay coalition members more
than their truthful forecasts. If the coalition
were created by an intermediary, such as a
web portal, the intermediary would be guar-
anteed a profit.
1 Introduction
Decision makers need to understand and evaluate com-
plex decision problems with considerable uncertainties.
Those uncertainties are integrated into decision mod-
els as forecasts in the form of probability distributions,
and the analysis is often quite sensitive to the distribu-
tions used. Statistical analysis can support this process
when there is sufficient relevant historical data. How-
ever, in many cases, decision makers must rely instead
on the judgment of experts to obtain useful probabilis-
tic forecasts.
In many applications of decision analysis, multiple in-
dividual judgments are engaged. Even when the deci-
sion maker has her own belief about the uncertainties,
she can benefit by integrating the judgments of others.
Incorporating diverse views from heterogeneous disci-
plines has been shown to improve assement accuracy
(Clemen 1989, Hoffmann et al. 2007). Several ap-
proaches have been developed in the literature to find
optimal combinations of multiple individuals’ judge-
ments (Clemen and Winkler 1999, Stone 1961, Morris
1977).
A strictly proper scoring rule measures the quality of
a probabilistic forecast based on the observed outcome
(Winkler 1996). It can be used, ex post, to evaluate
the quality of forecasters (Brier 1950), or, ex ante, to
encourage forecasters to articulate their best possible
report (Savage 1971). In either case, a scoring rule
captures the accuracy, calibration, knowledge, and ex-
pertise in assessment, encouraging a forecaster to be
careful and honest.
A decision maker who needs more knowledge about a
particular uncertainty can retain a panel of experts.
Each expert reports his forecast to her, and his pay-
ment can depend on the observed state, his report, and
the other reports, too. Although her contract with the
experts can provide a risk-free subsidy, it can also have
incentives for superior forecasts (Clemen 2002).
In recent years, prediction markets have been created
and several market designs have been developed (Pen-
nock 2004, Peters et al. 2006, Agrawal et al. 2009).
Prediction markets can elicit forecasts by aggregat-
ing the reports from many anonymous players inte-
grating their combined information (Berg and Rietz
2003). Some prominent prediction markets are Iowa
Electronic Markets, which focuses on political elec-
tion, Hollywood Stock Exchange, which focuses on
movies, NewsFutures.com, which covers politics, fi-
nance, sports and current international events. It has
been shown that forecasts from public prediction mar-
kets strongly correlate with observed outcomes (Pen-
nock et al. 2001, Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004).
The most popular type of contract in prediction mar-
kets is winner-take-all, where a player is paid if and
only if a specific event occurs (Wolfers and Zitzewitz
2004). A winner-take-all market does not induce truth-
ful individual reports. Depending on the assumptions
made, the equilibrium price of a prediction market is
either a particular quantile of the budget-weighted dis-
tribution of players’ beliefs (Manski 2006) or the mean
of those beliefs (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005).
Strictly proper scoring rules have also been applied to
groups of forecasters, where the payment depends on
the forecaster’s score relative to others. Hanson (2003)
introduced market scoring rules where the market sub-
sidizes the process. Kilgour and Gerchak (2004) devel-
oped competitive scoring rules which are self-financing
regardless of the number of players, their forecasts,
or the outcome. Johnstone (2007) elaborated the re-
lationship between the Kilgour-Gerchak logarithmic
scoring rules and the rewards from Kelly betting com-
petition. Lambert et al. (2008) proposed weighted-
score mechanisms, a modified form of Kilgour-Gerchak
competitive scoring rules, which ensure budget balance
and non-negative payments.
In this paper we explore payments for probabilistic
forecasts, either from a panel of experts or in a predic-
tion market. We consider strictly proper mechanisms,
both traditional and competitive scoring rules, which
have been shown to encourage forecasters to report
their true beliefs when acting independently. We show
that when forecasters with different beliefs are able to
cooperate and form a coalition, these mechanisms ad-
mit arbitrage. A similar result for concave traditional
scoring rules was suggested by French (1985). These
mechanisms actually discourage the coalition members
from reporting their true beliefs because they are guar-
anteed to receive more when they coordinate their re-
ports. If the coalition were created by an intermedi-
ary, such as a web portal, without the knowledge of
the players, the intermediary would be guaranteed a
profit.
It should not be surprising that mechanisms that en-
courage individuals acting alone to report honestly, do
otherwise when players can cooperate. This is sim-
ilar to results with auctions. Although second-price
auctions are incentive-compatible for individuals, co-
operation among bidders is a dominant strategy that
affects the reserve price for the auction (Graham and
Marshall 1987). Auctions with intermediaries are sim-
ilary influenced by cooperative behavior (Feldman et
al. 2010). Such cooperation is difficult to detect and
ambiguous to prove (McAfee and McMillan 1992).
In section 2 of this paper, we present the fundamental
notation and earlier results for traditional and com-
petitive scoring rules. We build on them to show how
strictly proper mechanisms admit arbitrage under co-
operation for traditional and competitive scoring rules,
in sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, we conclude
and present some future research in section 5.
2 Traditional and Competitive Scoring
Rules
A decision maker is concerned about a random vari-
able E with m mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive states given by Ω = {E1, E2, ..., Em}.
There are n forecasters or players, indexed by N =
{1, 2, ..., n}, who report probabilistic forecasts for E.
The players are assumed to be risk neutral and their
forecasts are in the simplex, denoted by ∆m =r ∈ Rm :
m￿
j=1
rj = 1, rj ≥ 0
. We assume that each
player i ∈ N believes that the event will occur ac-
cording with probability pi = (pi1, ..., pim) ∈ ∆m but
reports ri ∈ ∆m to the decision maker, where ri is
not necessarily equal to pi. We say that the players
in C ⊆ N agree if p1 = pi for all i ∈ C, and that
otherwise they disagree. The decision maker pays the
players according to a contract function, denoted by
Π : (∆m)n × Ω → Rn based on the reports of all
players and the observed state, so player i receives
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej).
A traditional scoring rule, S : ∆m × Ω → R, assigns
a real-valued score based solely on the player’s report
and the observed state. If the decision maker pays
player i
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = wiS (ri, Ej),
when Ej ∈ Ω is observed, where weight wi > 0, Π is
said to be a contract function for scoring rule S. A
scoring rule S is said to be strictly proper for player i
if
m￿
j=1
pijS (pi, Ej) >
m￿
j=1
pijS (ri, Ej)
whenever pi ￿= ri, for all pi, ri ∈ ∆m. The contract
function Π is strictly proper if
m￿
j=1
pijΠi(r1, ...,pi, ..., rn, Ej) >
m￿
j=1
pijΠi(r1, ..., rn, Ej)
whenever pi ￿= ri, for all i and all pi, r1, ..., rn ∈ ∆m.
Thus, under a a strictly proper mechanism, a risk neu-
tral player should report his true belief in order to max-
imize his expected score. Savage (1971) showed that
scoring rule S is strictly proper if and only if
S (ri, Ej) = G(ri)−∇G(ri)ri +∇jG(ri) (1)
for j = 1, ...,m, where G : ∆m → R is a continuously
differentiable strictly convex function.
The three strictly proper scoring rules most commonly
used in the literature are the quadratic (or Brier),
logarithmic, and spherical rules: (Winkler 1996, Jose
2008):
Quadratic: S (ri, Ej) = aj + b(2rij − ￿ri￿2),
Logarithmic: S (ri, Ej) = aj + b log rij , and
Spherical: S (ri, Ej) = aj +
brij
￿ri￿ ,
for any aj and any b > 0, where ￿ri￿ =
￿￿
r2ij
￿1/2, the
2-norm of the vector ri.
Of the three most common scoring rules, the quadratic
and spherical are bounded, but the logarithmic has no
lower bound, which makes it less attractive as a con-
tract payment. Therefore we propose a new strictly
proper scoring rule, a generalized logarithmic score
given by
Generalized Logarithmic:
S (ri, Ej) = aj + b log(rij + l) + bl
m￿
k=1
log(rik + l),
(2)
which is equal to the logarithmic score when l = 0 and
bounded when l > 0 for any aj and any b > 0.
Kilgour and Gerchak (2004) construct a self-financing
competitive scoring rule, where the total of the contract
functions for all players is zero. Their contract function
assigns a score based on the relative quality of each
forecast compared to the other forecasts. If Ej ∈ Ω is
observed, player i receives Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) determined
by
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = S (ri, Ej)− 1
n
￿
k∈N
S (rk, Ej) (3)
Lambert et al. (2008) propose a similar weighted-score
mechanism, denoted by
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = wiS (ri, Ej)− wi
wN
￿
k∈N
wkS (rk, Ej)
(4)
where weight wi > 0 can now be interpreted as the
wager chosen by player i and wC =
￿
k∈C wk for any
C ⊆ N . They require that scoring rule S be bounded,
mapping into [0, 1], to ensure that player i never loses
more than his wager wi. If a scoring rule S is strictly
proper, then so are the corresponding Kilgour-Gerchak
rule and weighted-score mechanisms (Kilgour and Ger-
chak, 2004; Lambert et al. 2008).
Hanson’s market scoring rule (2003) is also strictly
proper. Player i reports his forecast and is paid based
on that report and the report from the player who pre-
ceded him, i − 1, according to the following contract
rule:
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = S (ri, Ej)− S (ri−1, Ej). (5)
Although these mechanisms are all strictly proper
in the sense that each player, acting independently,
should report his true beliefs in order to maximize his
expected score, we will show that is not the case when
he can cooperate with other players.
3 Arbitrage with Traditional Scoring
Rules
Given a contract function for a strictly proper scoring
rule, we show how players should behave when they
are allowed to cooperate. Suppose that two or more
players form a coalition, C ⊆ N of size c = |C| ≥
2. We show that in a variety of circumstances, even
under a strictly proper mechanism, coalition members
who disagree about the forecasts will all be better off
coordinating their reports than reporting truthfully.
We say that contract Π admits arbitrage for coalition
C if, for any pi ∈ ∆m for all i ∈ C where the players in
C disagree, there are ri ∈ ∆m for all i ∈ C such that￿
i∈C
Πi(p1, ...,pn, Ej) <
￿
i∈C
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej)
for all j and all pk = rk ∈ ∆m for all k /∈ C. We com-
pare reports from coalition members with their true
beliefs given any possible reports from those outside
the coalition.
The contract Π admits arbitrage with identical reports
if q = ri for all i ∈ C for some q.
If a contract admits arbitrage for coalition C, then
whenever coalition members disagree about E the to-
tal payments to the coalition members will always be
greater ex post reporting ri rather than pi, regardless
which outcome is observed and what the other players
report. We call the additional payment to the coalition
members the surplus from cooperation.
3.1 Scoring Rules for Binary Events
We consider a binary event sample space Ω = {E1, E2},
so that each there is a single parameter ri for player
i to report, ri = (ri, 1 − ri) and the player’s belief
about E1 is characterized by pi, pi = (pi, 1 − pi). A
traditional strictly proper score S for a binary event
can be generally represented by
S (ri, E1) = G(ri) + (1− ri)G￿(ri),
S (ri, E2) = G(ri)− riG￿(ri),
where ri is the reported probability report for E1 andG
is a continuously differentiable strictly convex function
(Savage 1971).
Theorem 1 (Arbitrage with Binary E). Given binary
E, any contract function for a strictly proper scoring
rule admits arbitrage with identical reports. Whenever
coalition members maximizing their payments disagree
about E they should not report their true beliefs.
Proof. We will show that the contract function
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = S(ri, Ej) admits arbitrage with
identical reports q for any coalition C with c ≥ 2, where
q satisfies
G￿(q) =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
G￿(pi). (6)
G strictly convex implies that G￿ is strictly increasing.
Therefore, by the intermediate-value-theorem there ex-
ists a unique such q, mini∈C pi < q < maxi∈C pi.
Given such a q, there is the same surplus from co-
operation no matter which state of E is observed, and
because G is strictly convex, the surplus is strictly pos-
itive when the coalition members disagree,￿
i∈C
wiS (q, E1)
=
￿
i∈C
wi (G(q) + (1− q)G￿(q))
=
￿
i∈C
wi (G(q) + (1− q)G￿(pi))
>
￿
i∈C
wi (G(pi) + (q − pi)G￿(pi) + (1− q)G￿(pi))
=
￿
i∈C
wi (G(pi) + (1− pi)G￿(pi))
=
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, E1),
and ￿
i∈C
wiS (q, E2)−
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, E2)
=
￿
i∈C
wi (G(q)− qG￿(q))
−
￿
i∈C
wi (G(pi)− piG￿(pi))
=
￿
i∈C
wiS (q, E1)−
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, E1) > 0.
3.2 Strictly Concave Scoring Rules
In this section, we consider contract functions for
strictly concave scoring rules when E has m ≥ 2 pos-
sible states. These include quadratic and generalized
logarithmic scoring rules, but spherical scoring rules
are not concave. We show that strictly concave scor-
ing rules admit arbitrage for all coalitions, as suggested
by French (1985).
Theorem 2 (Arbitrage with Strictly Concave Scor-
ing Rule). Any contract function for a strictly con-
cave scoring rule admits arbitrage with identical re-
ports. Whenever coalition members maximizing their
payments disagree about E they should not report their
true beliefs.
Proof. Consider contract function Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) =
wiS(ri, Ej) and let the identical reports be
q =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
pi ∈ ∆m.
Whenever the members disagree, the strict concavity
of S with respect to ri implies that for any Ej the
surplus from cooperation is positive,￿
i∈C
wiS (q, Ej)−
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, Ej) > 0
.
3.3 Examples of Traditonal Strictly Proper
Scoring Rules
The three most commonly used strictly proper scoring
rules are the quadratic, logarithmic and spherical rules.
The contract function for these scoring rules admits ar-
bitrage with identical reports for any coalitions. Under
all three, when players are able to cooperate they can
be discouraged from reporting their true beliefs. The
results of this section are summarized in Table 1.
Example 1 (Quadratic Scoring Rule). The quadratic
scoring rule for event E is S (ri, Ej) = aj + b(2rij −
￿ri￿2). It is strictly concave with respect to ri, so it
admits arbitrage with identical reports
q =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
pi ∈ ∆m.
In this case, the surplus from cooperation is the same
for all outcome states Ej ,￿
i∈C
wiS (q, Ej)−
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, Ej)
= b
￿
i∈C
wi
￿
￿pi￿2 − ￿q￿2
￿
= b
￿
i∈C
wi ￿pi − q￿2 .
This surplus comes from the total variation among
the coalition members’ probabilities, a second moment
analogous to variance. It is positive unless they agree
on E and it increases when there is more disagree-
ment among the coalition members. For example, if
there were two members who disagreed about a binary
event, believing probabilities 0.2 and 0.8 for E1, their
surplus from cooperating and reporting 0.5 instead of
their true beliefs would be nine times the surplus they
would receive if they had believed 0.4 and 0.6 and re-
ported 0.5. Their disagreement is three times larger
and the surplus is therefore 32 larger.
Example 2 (Generalized Logarithmic Scoring Rule).
The generalized logarithmic scoring rule for event E
is S (ri, Ej) = aj + b log(rij + l) + bl
￿m
k=1 log(rik + l),
where l = 0 corresponds to the traditional logarith-
mic scoring rule. Because it is concave, by Theorem
2 it admits arbitrage with identical reports, equal to
the weighted arithmetic mean of the coalition mem-
bers’ forecasts, for any coalition. However, it is more
instructive to consider identical reports equal to the
normalized weighted geometric mean,
qj =
(1 +ml)
￿
i∈C (pij + l)
wi/wC￿m
k=1
￿
i∈C (pik + l)
wi/wC
− l. (7)
With this q the surplus from cooperation is
bwC (1 +ml) log
￿
1 +ml￿m
j=1
￿
i∈C (pij + l)wi/wC
￿
(8)
regardless of the observed outcome, and is strictly
positive whenever they disagree. By Jensen’s in-
equality,
￿
i∈C (pij + l)
wi/wC <
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
(pij + l), un-
less pij are the same for all i ∈ C. Summing
up each component,
￿m
j=1(
￿
i∈C (pij + l))
wi/wC <￿m
j=1
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
(pij + l) = 1 + ml, thus the equation
(8) is strictly positive.
Example 3 (Spherical Scoring Rule). The spherical
scoring rule for event E, S (ri, Ej) = aj + brij/￿ri￿,
also admits arbitrage with identical reports for any
coalition. However, a spherical score is not a concave
function, and the arithmetic mean does not always lead
to arbitrage. For example, if there were two members
who disagreed about a binary event, believing proba-
bilities 0.1 and 0.4 for E1, although they would always
be better off both reporting 0.275 than reporting their
true beliefs, they are not always better off reporting
the arithmetic mean 0.25.
Theorem 3 (Arbitrage with Spherical Scoring Rule).
Any contract function for a spherical scoring rule
admits arbitrage with identical reports. Whenever
coalition members maximizing their payments disagree
about E they should not report their true beliefs.
The proof is given in the Appendix. It shows that there
is an identical report q ∈ ∆m with components
qj =
1
m
+
Yj − Y￿
m(1−￿mk=1(Yk − Y )2) (9)
where Yj =
￿
i∈C
wipij
wC ￿pi￿ and Y =
1
m
m￿
j=1
Yj .
The surplus from cooperation is
bwC
￿1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2
m
− Y
 (10)
regardless of the observed outcome, and is strictly pos-
itive whenever they disagree.
4 Arbitrage with Competitive Scoring
Rules
In Section 3 we showed that contracts for strictly
proper scoring rules admit arbitrage when players can
cooperate. We build on those results in this section
to show how competitive mechanisms, shown to be
strictly proper when players act independently, also
admit arbitrage when players can cooperate. As a re-
sult, such mechanisms can discourage coalition mem-
bers from reporting truthful forecasts whenever they
disagree.
4.1 Self-Financed Competitive Mechanisms
We consider a self-financed competitive mechanism
with contract function given by
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej) = wiS (ri, Ej)− wi
wN
￿
k∈N
wkS (rk, Ej),
(11)
where the traditional scoring rule S is strictly proper
and the wagers wi > 0 are positive. This mechanism is
self-financing, with contract functions summing to zero
in all outcome states. It generalizes both the Kilgour-
Gerchak and Lambert mechanisms for the purposes of
this paper. If all of the wagers are equal, wi = w1
for all i ∈ N , this is the Kilgour-Gerchak competitive
scoring rule. If the range of the scoring rule is re-
stricted to [0, 1], then it is the Lambert weighted-score
mechanism, and each player i never loses more than
his wager, Πi > −wi.
Theorem 4 (Arbitrage with Self-Financed Competi-
tive Mechanism). Given that the contract function for
a strictly proper scoring rule admits arbitrage, any self-
financed competitive mechanism using the same scor-
ing rule admits arbitrage for any coalition including at
least two but not all of the players. Whenever coalition
members maximizing their payments disagree about E
they should not report their true beliefs.
Proof. Suppose that the contract function admits ar-
bitrage for coalition C with each player i ∈ C believing
pi and reporting ri, while each player k /∈ C reports rk
Table 1: Examples of identical reports q for arbitrage in contracts for scoring rules
Type of scoring rule Condition for q
Score for Binary Event G￿(q) =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
G￿(pi)
Concave Score q =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
pi
Quadratic Score q =
￿
i∈C
wi
wC
pi
Generalized Logarithmic Score qj =
(1 +ml)
￿
i∈C (pij + l)
wi/wC￿m
k=1
￿
i∈C (pik + l)
wi/wC
− l
Spherical Score qj =
1
m
+
Yj − Y￿
m(1−￿mk=1(Yk − Y )2)
where Yj =
￿
i∈C
wipij
wC ￿pi￿ , Y =
1
m
m￿
j=1
Yj
and we will let pk = rk. The surplus from cooperation
when Ej is observed is￿
i∈C
Πi(r1, ..., rn, Ej)−
￿
i∈C
Πi(p1, ...,pn, Ej)
=
￿
i∈C
wiS (ri, Ej)− wC
wN
￿
k∈C
wkS (rk, Ej)
−
￿
i∈C
wiS (pi, Ej) +
wC
wN
￿
k∈C
wkS (pk, Ej)
=
￿
1− wC
wN
￿￿
i∈C
wi [S (ri, Ej)− S (pi, Ej)] .
Thus the competitive mechanism admits arbitrage for
the coalition provided wC < wN .
We have shown that there is surplus from cooperation
for both the Kilgour-Gerchak competitive scoring rule
and the Lambert weighted-score mechanism. In pre-
diction markets, it would be difficult to prevent players
from cooperating, and they could in fact do so without
even knowing it. An intermediary, such as a web por-
tal, can create a coalition among players, and exploit
the surplus from cooperation that comes from bringing
together forecasters who disagree. Such an intermedi-
ary can provide a convenient service for players who
want to enter their forecasts into the prediction mar-
ket, reimbursing them as if their forecasts were actually
entered into the market. However, if the intermediary
instead submits identical reports for each of them, or
one large wager with that report, he would be guaran-
teed a profit if any of the players disagree, even if he
had no knowledge about the uncertainty. The players
might be unaware they had participated in a coalition.
Next we consider how large a coalition should be to
maximize the expected surplus.
Theorem 5 (Optimal Coalition Size). Given that a
large number of players n are participating with equal
wagers, their forecasts are believed to be exchangeable,
and the contract admits arbitrage with identical reports,
the ideal size for a coalition C in order to maximize the
expected surplus from cooperation includes all players
under a contract for a strictly proper scoring rule, and
half of the wagers, wC = 12wN , under a self-financed
competitive mechanism.
Proof. For a large enough population, the identical re-
port for members of the coalition q would not depend
on the size of the coalition. Therefore, the expected
surplus from cooperation under a contract for a scor-
ing rule when Ej is observed is
￿
i∈C
wi
￿
S(q, Ej)−
￿
pi∈∆m
S(pi, Ej)dF (pi)
￿
= wC
￿
S(q, Ej)−
￿
p∈∆m
S(p, Ej)dF (p)
￿
,
which is proportional to wC and it is maximized by in-
cluding all players. If players are paid by a self financed
competitive mechnism, the expected surplus from co-
operation when Ej is observed is￿
1− wC
wN
￿￿
i∈C
wi
￿
S(q, Ej)−
￿
pi
S(pi, Ej)dF (pi)
￿
=
￿
1− wC
wN
￿
wC
￿
S(q, Ej)−
￿
p
S(p, Ej)dF (p)
￿
.
This is proportional to wC (wN − wC). Therefore, it is
maximized when wC = 12wN .
In a contract for a scoring rule, the surplus from co-
operation is proportional to the size of the coalition,
and the surplus is largest with all players cooperating.
However, under a competitive mechanism the surplus
comes from the players outside the coalition and from
the variation among the players within it, and there-
fore the surplus is largest when half of the wagers are
from members, wC = 12wN . Note that if our objective
were to maximize the surplus per member, i.e. the to-
tal surplus from cooperation divided by the size of the
coalition, we would prefer a smaller coalition.
4.2 Market Scoring Rules
We now consider Hanson’s market scoring rule, which
combines the advantages of scoring rules and standard
information markets, and show conditions under which
cooperating players maximizing their total payment
are discouraged from reporting their true forecasts.
Theorem 6 (Arbitrage with Market Scoring Rules).
Given that the contract function for a strictly proper
scoring rule admits arbitrage, a market scoring rule
using the same scoring rule admits arbitrage for any
coalition C ⊆ N if players outside the coalition re-
port before each coalition member, and those players’
reports are independent of the coalition members’ re-
ports. Whenever coalition members maximizing their
payments disagree about E they should not report their
true beliefs.
Proof. Suppose that the contract function admits ar-
bitrage for coalition C with each player i ∈ C believing
pi and reporting ri, while each player k /∈ C reports
rk. For any observed outcome Ej the surplus from
cooperation is￿
i∈C
[S (ri, Ej)− S (ri−1, Ej)]
−
￿
i∈C
[S (pi, Ej)− S (ri−1, Ej)]
=
￿
i∈C
S (ri, Ej)−
￿
i∈C
S (pi, Ej).
Although the independence and alternating participa-
tion conditions assumed for the theorem are rather
strong, they provide a scenario under which the market
scoring rule admits arbitrage.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that many of the strictly proper mecha-
nisms that have been shown to encourage forecasters to
report their true beliefs fail to do so when the forecast-
ers are able to cooperate. When players form a coali-
tion they always receive more by coordinating their
reports because the mechanisms admit arbitrage. We
have shown this happens with contracts for traditional
strictly proper scoring rules, including the quadratic,
logarithmic, and spherical scoring rules. We have also
shown this arbitrage for competitive mechanisms based
on strictly proper scoring rules, such as those proposed
by Hanson (2003), Kilgour and Gerchak (2004) and
Lambert et al. (2008).
We had been hoping to use these results to develop a
mechanism resistant to cooperation. It is still an open
question whether there is any strictly proper mecha-
nism that does not admit arbitrage, but it seems un-
likely. In prediction markets, it would be difficult to
prevent players from cooperating, or to prevent an in-
termediary, such as a web portal, from exploiting the
surplus from cooperation that comes from bringing to-
gether forecasters who disagree. Such an intermediary
would be guaranteed a profit even if she had no knowl-
edge about the uncertainty.
For a decision maker subsidizing a prediction market to
observe players’ true forecasts, these results raise ques-
tions. They suggest that coalitions obtain their surplus
from cooperation by reducing the variation among the
reports from members, falsely appearing to reach con-
sensus. Thus, decision makers would lose valuable in-
formation about the diversity of opinion among fore-
casters, and might lose the benefit of their heteroge-
neous information sources.
Another issue with cooperation is that the surplus from
cooperation can increase the cost to the decision maker
for the contract for traditional scoring rules while dis-
torting the information she obtains. Although there
is no increase in the cost for self-financing competitive
mechanisms, in that case the surplus comes from the
players who are not cooperating, reducing their incen-
tive to participate.
In situations where a decision maker can identify a par-
ticular forecaster in order to weight his report based on
his reputation or other characteristics, his report can
be misleading when he is acting as a coalition member
rather than stating his true beliefs. One significant
exception, when the information is not distorted by
cooperation, is when the decision maker will use only
the weighted average of the forecasts and the scoring
rule is quadratic, encouraging coalitions to report their
weighted average forecast.
In performing our analysis of cooperating players, we
have focused on arbitrage rather than maximal ex-
pected payment. For example, if the coalition is man-
aged by an intermediary maximizing her expected pay-
ment, she should make an identical report for all of
the coalition’s wagers using her personal forecast. We
consider it more prudent to demonstrate how she can
make a guaranteed profit without taking any risk or
possessing any expertise.
Finally, while we have examined the surplus from coop-
eration for a coalition, we have not discussed how coali-
tion members should behave inside a coalition. Three
related issues are what coalition members will report
to each other, what they will report to the decision
maker, and how they will share the surplus from coop-
eration. We have studied this problem assuming that
players can act strategically within the coalition, seek-
ing to maximize their expected payments in the con-
text of the coalition’s decision process (Chun 2011).
We assume that
• players will be paid according to a quadratic scor-
ing rule;
• coalition members report to the decision maker
the weighted average of the reports they shared
within the coalition;
• coalition members distribute the surplus from co-
operation proportional to their weights; and
• each coalition member believes that the expecta-
tion of the average of the other members’ true
probabilities is the same as his own probability,
Epi
￿￿
k∈C
wk
wC
pk
￿
= pi, for all i ∈ C.
These are reasonable for players who accept the “wis-
dom of crowds.” Under these assumptions, because
each coalition member wants to report truthfully
within the coalition assuming that the others do so,
it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for every coalition
member to report truthfully within the coalition.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
We need to show that any contract for a spherical scor-
ing rule admits arbitrage with identical report q for any
coalition C of size c ≥ 2, where
qj =
1
m
+
Yj − Y￿
m(1−￿mk=1(Yk − Y )2) ,
Yj =
￿
i∈C
wipij
wC ￿pi￿ , and Y =
1
m
m￿
j=1
Yj . The surplus
from cooperation is
bwC
￿1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2
m
− Y

regardless of the observed outcome.
If all members of the coalition agree about E then q =
pi for all i ∈ C. For the rest of this proof we will
assume that the members disagree about E.
We will show that there is positive surplus from coop-
eration and that q ∈ ∆m. First, we find an expression
for ￿q￿.
￿q￿2
=
m￿
j=1
q2j
=
m￿
j=1
1
m2
+
m￿
j=1
2(Yj − Y )
m
￿
m(1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2)
+
m￿
j=1
(Yj − Y )2
m(1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2)
=
1
m
+
￿m
j=1(Yj − Y )2
m(1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2)
(because
m￿
j=1
(Yj − Y ) = 0)
=
1
m(1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2)
The surplus from cooperation by reporting q is
b
￿
i∈C
wiqj
￿q￿ − b
￿
i∈C
wipij
￿pi￿
= b
wC
m ￿q￿ + bwCYj − bwCY − b
￿
i∈C
wipij
￿pi￿
= b
wC
m ￿q￿ + b
￿
i∈C
wipij
￿pi￿
− bwCY − b
￿
i∈C
wipij
￿pi￿
= bwC
￿
1
m ￿q￿ − Y
￿
= bwC
￿1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2
m
− Y
 ,
regardless of the observed outcome Ej . Next, we
prove that this surplus is strictly positive if and only
if
￿m
j=1 Y
2
j < 1.
bwC
￿1−￿mj=1(Yj − Y )2
m
− Y
 > 0
⇔ 1−
￿m
j=1(Yj − Y )2
m
> Y
2
⇔ 1−
m￿
j=1
(Yj − Y )2 > mY 2
⇔ 1−
m￿
j=1
Y 2j +mY
2
> mY
2
⇔ 1 >
m￿
j=1
Y 2j
m￿
j=1
Y 2j
=
m￿
j=1
￿￿
i∈C
wipij
wC ￿pi￿
￿2
=
m￿
j=1
￿
i∈C
w2i p
2
ij
w2C ￿pi￿2
+ 2
￿
i<k
i∈C,k∈C
wiwkpijpkj
w2C ￿pi￿ ￿pk￿

By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, m￿
j=1
pijpkj
2 < m￿
j=1
p2ij
m￿
j=1
p2kj = ￿pi￿2 ￿pk￿2
⇔
m￿
j=1
pijpkj < ￿pi￿ ￿pk￿
where the inequalities are strict because the coalition
members disagree about E. Therefore,
m￿
j=1
Y 2j
=
￿
i∈C
m￿
j=1
w2i p
2
ij
w2C ￿pi￿2
+ 2
￿
i<k
i∈C,k∈C
m￿
j=1
wiwkpijpkj
w2C ￿pi￿ ￿pk￿
<
w2i
w2C
+ 2
￿
i<k
i∈C,k∈C
wiwk ￿pi￿ ￿pk￿
w2C ￿pi￿ ￿pk￿
=
￿￿
i∈C
wi
wC
￿2
= 1
We have shown that the surplus from cooperation is
positive for all states of Ej .
Finally, we must prove that q lies in the simplex ∆m.
Iit suffices to show that
￿m
j=1 qj = 1 and qj ≥ 0, for
all j = 1, ...,m.
m￿
j=1
qj =
m￿
j=1
￿q￿
￿
1
m ￿q￿ + Yj − Y
￿
= ￿q￿
 1￿q￿ +
m￿
j=1
Yj −mY

= 1.
We have shown that
1
m ￿q￿ − Y > 0, so
qj = ￿q￿
￿
1
m ￿q￿ + Yj − Y
￿
> 0.
